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Affect and Research 
On first learning that the Scrolls of Auschwitz, the testimony of the Sonderkommando found buried near the 
crematoria at Birkenau in the extermination camp itself, were to be analysed as literary documents, my 
reaction was an involuntary but resounding 'no'. Here, in its own way, was surely 'the surfeit of memory'  that 
Charles Maier (1993) had talked about. Not only did it seem almost impossible to view the Scrolls as texts 
when their very materiality was so charged, but I also could not help but wonder how Nicholas Chare and 
Dominic Williams could mobilise their cognitive skills without also letting loose a school of other, less 
welcome, sensibilities. The Scrolls, I found myself initially thinking, belonged more in a reliquary than academic 
seminar. In the event (2010), Chare and Williams's meticulous scholarship and deep sensitivity rendered such 
misgivings redundant, and I dismissed my own first instincts as those of someone, a child of survivors, with a 
heightened engagement with testimony. Yet as I began to reflect more on the question, it seemed to me that 
such instinctual responses should not immediately be evicted but were themselves material that merited 
analysis because they touch on powerful ideas about how Holocaust research can and should be conducted, 
and speak of the existence of an underworld of unruly feelings that, by being exposed to the light of scrutiny 
and discussion, can help deepen and enrich Holocaust scholarship. 
Debates about the role of affect in researching and writing about the Holocaust are not new: it is  almost 15 
years since Dominick LaCapra talked of the need  'to examine one's implication in the problems one studies - 
issues that are pronounced with respect to extremely traumatic phenomena in which one's investment is 
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great' (1998, p.17). Since then positivist assumptions and practices - that history can be studied dispassionately 
and objectively - have been so robustly challenged by postmodern critiques that it might seem as if the battle 
has been won and no self-respecting scholar could embark on Holocaust research with a sense of themselves 
as disinterested observer intact.  And yet, in reality, Holocaust historiography remains dominated by a 
positivist historical method (Stone, 2012), and in practice it is common to find historical accounts where the 
idea that studying trauma might also produce it remains quite foreign. Historians rarely reflect on their own 
affective investment in the material they study; indeed, there is often an inverse relationship between the 
traumatic intensity of the event being studied and their readiness to discuss their own emotional involvement 
or the affective sources which led them to take up that research field in the first place.
 
More than that, any 
leakage of feeling into research often still seems to be a source of shame, a transgression of the ideal type 
researcher. What appears to be demanded of the historian, in such cases, is the blank canvas of the 
psychoanalyst, upon which history itself can project its own feelings. This kind of history has its roots, 
according to Hayden White, in the 'profound hostility to all forms of myth' (White, 1978, p.123) in 
historiography after the French Revolution, which required the historian to expunge from their apprehension 
of reality any intuitive processes.  
In reality, of course, analysts themselves have feelings, and those treating Holocaust survivors have described 
the anxieties stirred up in them when they have encountered the horrors of the concentration camps 
experienced by their patients. In such cases the psychoanalyst has to confront their own resistances in order to 
help produce an effective analysis. Ilse Grubrich-Simitis has argued that 'The ability to empathise with sufferers 
is a precarious cultural acquisition' (Grubrich-Simitis, 1981, p.442), and is threatened by the defences activated 
by the analyst to protect themselves against the revival of the infant's feeling of extreme helplessness in the 
face of existential threat. By identifying with the survivor patient 'are we not in fact afraid that...we might 
experience, albeit in an incomparably weaker form, something of that which the survivors actually lived 
through?' (p.444) In order to be able to help the analysand the analyst has to achieve their own 'successful' 
work of mourning the Holocaust (Grubrich-Simitis, 1984).  
Historians are not psychoanalysts, yet neither can historical method seal them against the transference and 
counter-transference set off by Holocaust research. Researchers, no less than psychoanalysts, experience 
resistances and defences of their own in working with traumatic material. Dealing with testimony, LaCapra 
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argues, 'raises the issue of the way in which the historian or other analyst becomes a secondary witness, 
undergoes a transferential relation, and must work out an acceptable subject-position with respect to the 
witness and his or her testimony' (1998, p.11). The refusal of some historians to engage with testimonial 
literature, according to Federico Finchelstein, 'is also a mechanism of defense, of neutralizing one's own 
subject-position vis-a-vis the traumatic charge that seems to emanate from victims' testimonies' (Laub and 
Finchelstein, 2010, p.59). The role of secondary witness places a heavy burden of responsibility on the 
researcher, and positions them in a relay of memory - a chain of testimony in which they act as a medium for 
the transmission of first-hand accounts to future generations for whom the Holocaust will be nothing but 
history. In the case of testimony left by victims rather than survivors, the burden is even heavier, and the 
researcher becomes not only a secondary witness but in some sense also a surrogate one, charged with 
speaking on behalf of those who no longer can.  
One might argue that this is the case with historical documents of any kind - preserving and transmitting 'thick' 
description and memory left by preceding generations is the very nature of the historical task - and yet when 
the testimony concerns such a comprehensive and unprecedented attempt to extirpate memory itself, its 
retrieval enlists the researcher (albeit in footling fashion) in the project to challenge both Nazi ideology and the 
whole National Socialist enterprise. Rare must be the researcher in whom an alternating sense of impotence 
and omnipotence, inadequacy and awe are entirely absent. These sentiments, I want to suggest, are legitimate 
material for debate and discussion, and not extrinsic to the historical events themselves. We are tempted, 
perhaps, to write them off because, in the crude Freudianism that is current and widespread, psychic 
responses are thought to result almost entirely from individual subjectivity: they reside in the personal 
unconscious and appear autonomous. Although cultural studies have been deeply informed by psychoanalysis, 
bringing psychoanalytic theories into contact with Holocaust research (or, even worse, the Holocaust 
researcher) still seems to represent a dangerous turn away from historical and sociological analysis, running 
the risk of banalising the Holocaust and narcissistically replacing the perpetrators, victims and bystanders as 
the focal point of research with the researchers themselves.   
In reality, 'structures of feeling' (Williams, 1986) are as culturally produced and historically contingent as the 
notion that you can do history without feeling, and our affective responses to the encounter with Holocaust 
material are themselves a historical resource. By keeping these emotions latent we not only deny ourselves 
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another dimension through which to understand the Holocaust and its aftermath but also endow them with 
the power to destabilise the research. It must be stressed that we are engaged here in a project not of 
psychohistory (which often hovers intolerably close to exculpation) or any kind of speculative psychological 
profiling of either perpetrators or victims but rather the adopting of a reflexive stance about the researcher's 
own practice:  
'Without at least the awareness of what defence mechanisms are and what they do, the historian is at the 
mercy of her own repressions. These repressions and resistances will determine, to a certain extent, what it is 
the historian chooses to write about or not write about. What gets excluded from history, then, has as much to 
do with what it is historians can psychically handle' (Morris, 2001, pp.54-55).  
Dirk Rupnow has argued, for example, that historians have been reluctant to describe in detail what happened 
in the gas chambers in part through self-protection and their inability to bear those details (Rupnow, 2012). On 
the other hand the blithe confidence of Hugh Trevor-Roper, author of 'The Last Days of Hitler', when he 
wrongly authenticated the forged diaries of Hitler, may have owed something to a sense of grandiosity 
developed when studying Hitler's final months in the bunker (Rosenbaum, 1998). 
My concern here is with what gets excluded from history but also with the psychological freight that history 
has to carry. My starting-point is my own psychic load as the daughter of Holocaust survivors. I have described 
elsewhere (Karpf, 2008) my experiences growing up with survivor parents, and the dawning realisation that 
much of what I'd assumed to be a purely personal pathology was actually common to members of the so-
called 'second generation'
1
. Since the book's original publication in 1996, the circles of impact have widened 
further still, and I have become aware that some of the reactions that I had assumed were confined to children 
of survivors are, in fact, shared by those without direct personal connections to the Holocaust: they are part of 
what Marianne Hirsch calls 'postmemory'. Although Hirsch coined this phrase to describe children of Holocaust 
survivors and of parents who had suffered other collective traumatic experiences, it seems to me to bear 
application more generally also to those born after the Holocaust and grappling with it in various ways, since 
she defines postmemory as 'a powerful and particular form of memory precisely because its connection to its 
object or source is mediated not through recollection but through an imaginative investment and creation' 
(Hirsch, 1997, p.22).  
5 
 
 
Impulses and phantasies 
Freud identified the rescue phantasies that some men have for women (1958a).  Children of Holocaust 
survivors, overwhelmed by the stories they have heard or gleaned about their parents' experience of extreme 
brutality and the prospect of annihilation, commonly entertain retrospective rescue phantasies of their own. I 
want to suggest that Holocaust researchers and commentators, while they remain sufficiently in touch with 
reality to know that the victims of Nazism remain dead, and that pivotal events that helped survivors to survive 
took place decades earlier, may have their own version of the rescue phantasy, but in this they help rescue the 
survivor, or, more poignantly, the victim, not from death but from oblivion. They are tasked with pulling 
memory from the rubble of the past, of reviving memories and descriptions that have been almost obliterated, 
to claim a place for victims and survivors in collective memory. In the case of the Scrolls of Auschwitz how 
much more compelling might rescue phantasies be since the testimony literally had a humus of crematoria 
ashes and decomposed bone clinging to it. How hard it must have been, one imagines, for Chare and Williams, 
and the Scrolls researchers who preceded them, to resist the idea that these artefacts represented an 
unmediated past, a synecdoche, a frayed remnant of the Holocaust itself.  Or to eschew  the phantasy that in 
some way they might be imaginatively resuscitating its authors...  
Claude Lanzmann has made explicit his own rescue phantasies, as expressed in his film 'Shoah', where he 
fixates on the loneliness of the death of Holocaust victims, and retrospectively inserts himself into their 
narrative to keep them company: 
'The idea that always has been most painful for me is that all these people died alone... A meaning for me 
that is simultaneously  the most profound and the most incomprehensible in the film is in a certain way... 
to resuscitate these people, to kill them a second time, with me accompanying them' (Qtd in LaCapra, 
1998,p.133) 
Interestingly, even in phantasy Lanzmann cannot entertain such omnipotence as could reverse time (for some, 
this may be the only way of engaging with the Holocaust; it was given fictional form in Martin Amis's novel 
'Time's Arrow', 1992), although the impulse to somehow defeat or overcome time is certainly a common 
response to the Holocaust. In 'The War After' I described how tenaciously in my imagination I had clung to an 
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old and mythologised Poland until I actually visited the country. Even then I viewed the present through the 
lens of the past, imbuing each receipt and postcard with a sense of 'lostness' far in excess of what it might 
actually sustain, 'as if they were archaeological relics encoded with meanings and potential clues' (p.297).  
After visiting both Plaszow and Birkenau, where my mother was an inmate, I came to realise how thoroughly I 
had  
confused time and place, history and geography, as if coming in person to the site of terrible events which 
occurred fifty years ago could somehow yield them up for us to transform them - they might actually extrude 
through the stones and the earth and be mitigated by modern sorrow. But it is time which has enfolded and 
buried those events, not place, and it was their contemporaries on different continents who had the possibility 
of intervening, not those of us standing here now. (p.300)  
This attempt to erase the distance between past and present is not, I've come to believe, particular to children 
of survivors, even though we may experience it particularly acutely, but embeds itself in the undertow of much 
historical research and cultural debate. Implicit in the project of recording is the impulse to prevent the kind of 
'second murder' committed by time itself: time becomes not just the agent of forgetting but an active 
accomplice in the task. Research and writing, by contrast, act as an antidote, a countervailing force, seeming to 
confer immortality. Pierre Nora has argued that our ‘hallucinations of the past’, the result of discontinuities 
and distance from events, stoke our sense of wanting to retrieve the past’s secrets. 'The most fundamental 
purpose of the lieu de memoire is to stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a state of things, to 
immortalize death, to materialize the immaterial… to capture a maximum of meaning in the fewest of signs' 
(1989), even though, as James Young has pointed out, 'once we assign monumental form to memory, we have 
to some degree divested ourselves of the obligation to remember' (Young, 1993).  
Lanzmann has acknowledged how the recurring desolate images of rolling trains in 'Shoah' expressed a 
yearning for the erasure of time:  
These disfigured places are what I call nonplaces of memory (non-lieux de memoire). At the same it is 
nevertheless necessary that traces remain. I must hallucinate and think that nothing has changed. I was 
conscious of change but, at the same time, I had to think that time had not accomplished its work. (Qtd in 
LaCapra, 1998, p.133)  
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We must guard against pathologising such phantasies but rather recognise them as one way of dealing with 
trauma and the painful feelings of impotence that it can excite in the secondary or surrogate witness. Another 
way of dealing with such secondary trauma is through what LaCapra calls 'archival fetishism'. The anguished 
exhortation of the historian Simon Dubnow, murdered by the Nazis, 'Shreibt un farshreibt!' ('Write and 
record!') (Marrus, 1997, p.xiii), seems to have been infused with almost magical properties, so fiercely and 
religiously have researchers adhered to it, recording whatever minutiae of life and death under Nazism can be 
recovered. It sometimes seems as though every receipt or timetable, each log or inventory, has evidentiary 
potential, as if, with sufficient determination and graft on the part of the researcher, some new constellation 
of information might be revealed.  
It is impossible not to be moved by the scrupulousness of much of this research and its pressing agenda of 
recovery. In part it is a belated response to survivors' need to bear witness and be listened to, a need mostly 
unmet in the aftermath of the war and for years to come. Primo Levi found that speaking and not being 
listened was almost as grievous to him as his camp experiences, and represented a second abandonment by 
the world after the first abandonment during the war (Levi, 1987, p.227).  
And yet, on occasion, when it comes to documentation, there is an almost palpable excess in operation, and 
the boundary between a thing and a person, a document and the individuals who produced it, is at risk of 
becoming dissolved, or at least made tenuous. Even Raul Hilberg, the archetypal 'rational' historian, found 
himself in thrall to the magical aura of some of his sources. In 'Shoah', he hinted as much when he tried to 
explain to Lanzmann why documents were so fascinating to him: 
Well, you see, when I hold a document in my hand, particularly if it's an original document, then I hold 
something which is actually something that the original bureaucrat held in his hand. It's an artifact. It's a 
leftover. It's the only leftover there is. The dead are not around. (Qtd in LaCapra, 1998, p.132)  
The care extended to Holocaust documents is all the more poignant because these are traces, leftovers, 
remnants (Agamben, 2008). Each time we handle attentively a Holocaust testimony or the records of a victim, 
it brings into consciousness, or to its rim, the lacunae that cannot be filled, the documents that will not be 
found and, most unspeakably, our knowledge of the lack of care and humanity allowed to its subject. Or as 
Helga Satzinger put it, 'So much effort put into preserving records of people, and so much effort put into their 
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murder.'
2
 Testimony is always in dialogue with silence and absence; the more heedfully and thoughtfully we 
treat it, the more painful it becomes. 
Traces 
Phantasies of comprehensiveness and completeness dog most archival researchers at one time or another, 
whatever their field, yet in the case of Holocaust research these are particularly charged, because of the Nazis' 
declared intention to remove all traces of their crimes, and produce a genocide without witnesses or traces, 
leading to claims of 'memorycide'. Thus behind archival fetishism lies an even larger project, one in which 
remembering and retrieving are endowed with almost prophylactic capacities, and the potential to somehow 
avoid a recurrence of atrocity, if only every shred of evidence is exhumed and preserved. As Rupnow has 
argued, "Destruction and forgetting on the one hand and remembrance and justice on the other hand are 
usually seen as not simply arbitrarily linked but as inseparable in their character" (Rupnow, 2012, p.63).
3
 It is as 
though historical memory carries some sort of retributory charge, and the very act of memorialising is not only 
a retrospective act of preservation but also, somehow, a prospective one too - a reversal of time's arrow 
indeed. 
 
For the Jewish researcher in particular, recovering traces and witnesses can thus become a small but 
significant act of retrospective resistance, which can all too easily slide into a compulsion. The case of Edmund 
de Waal is one such example. In The Hare With Amber Eyes, his fine account of how he tracked, through the 
biography of the netsuke bequeathed him by his great uncle, his ancestral Jewish family's experiences in 
Europe under Nazism, de Waal relates how he tries 'to hunt down' every picture that hung in his ancestor 
Charles Ephrussi's room in 19th century Paris. He starts to list all the museums in which the paintings now 
hang, to trace how they got there, and contemplates how long it would take him to go to them all, to see 'if I 
can see what his eyes saw' (2007, p.87),
 
before he realises the impossibility of the task. But the impulse is 
there, and de Waal's obsession with the tiniest detail of his ancestors' lives, his copious chronicling of the 
provenance, placing and afterlife of their artefacts, gives the measure of his grief. 
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The compulsion to chronicle copiously is a reparative one: it tries to re-humanise those who were 
dehumanised in the Holocaust. Perhaps, too, it acts as a kind of obsession-compulsion that helps to keep at 
bay the horror. If one is always engaged in research one never has time to stop and let the subject matter 
overwhelm one. As Griselda Pollock, writing about Charlotte Salomon's 'Leben? oder Theater?', put it:  
What is a subject in catastrophic circumstances when all that "I" appear to be under is the condition of 
subjective dissolution and politically encompassed annihilation? Charlotte Salomon used love and philosophy. 
They did not save her. But she has a name. We must honor it by reading her work with care. (Pollock, 2011, 
p.14) 
De Waal observes, of his own obsessive chronicling, 'I think... of all the listings of families in the manifests, for 
deportations. If others can be so careful over things that are so important, then I must be careful over these 
objects and their stories' (p.348). 
Maike Rotzoll, a German psychiatrist, has researched the murder of institutionalised German psychiatric 
patients at six killing centres under the Aktion T4 euthanasia programme. Together with colleagues, she used 
the discarded files of 3000 of these patients, found after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to discover on what basis 
they were selected for the gas chambers. Most of these patients have, until now, had no name. Indeed, until 
recently there was little interest in them: although there was a card index of perpetrators, none existed of 
victims. At the very least Rotzoll and her colleagues are trying to rescue them from anonymity and name them; 
where possible they have also attempted to reconstruct their life stories. Patients such as Karl Ahrendt, killed 
at 87, 33 years after he was first hospitalised: 'After his admission', Rotzoll notes, 'Ahrendt didn't exist any 
more - he vanished behind official forms' (2010). The treasure trove of paintings by the incarcerated that they 
also found, such as drawings by Wilhelm Werner, 1898-1940, a victim of compulsory sterilisation, reveal the 
human subjectivity behind the number. His work is among that exhibited at the Prinzhorn Cellection Museum 
in Heidelberg.
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As Baudrillard put it, 'Forgetting extermination is part of extermination, because it is also the extermination of 
memory, of history, or the social' (1994).
5
 Naming thus becomes important not just as a historical tool but also 
as an act of memorialising. The gathering of names takes on the flavour of a commemorative book; it is a small 
gesture of Wiedergutmachung. Perhaps because of the nature of the material, and also because she is a 
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German psychiatrist working on files in which her predecessors are implicated, Rotzoll is sensitive to her own 
investment in the project. 'We're psychiatrists and seeing every day patients who would have been murdered 
under the Nazis. Reading a file you seem to be in contact in some way with that person. The most difficult 
moment is to put the file away: you don't know if, in the future, anyone will ever look at it again.'
6
 Like 
Lanzmann, Rotzoll has tried to 'accompany' her subjects, but has had to painfully acknowledge the moment 
that they part. 
Sacralisation 
The suggestion that Holocaust researchers and writers should scrutinise their own engagement with trauma 
might be thought to bring risks of its own, most notably that, in rejecting a positivist methodology, we 
embrace an over-identification with the victim, something of which LaCapra rightly accuses Lanzmann (1998). 
In Lanzmann's case he went so far as to publicly humiliate an Auschwitz survivor who planned to screen a 
documentary with which he disagreed, and to excoriate anyone who attempted to seek explanations as to why 
the Holocaust took place. In appropriating the terrible dictum of an SS guard to Primo Levi - 'Hier ist kein 
warum' (here there is no why) - and perversely recasting it as his own slogan, Lanzmann loses not only any 
sense of humility but also hubristically marks out the acceptable field of study in his capacity as surrogate 
survivor-in-chief (Rosenbaum, 1998).   
Self-aggrandisement is not particular to Lanzmann. Daniel Goldhagen, author of 'Hitler's Willing Executioners', 
claimed to be 'reconceiving central aspects of the Holocaust' (1997, p.3). He deliberately 'eschews the clinical 
approach' in his account of 'blood, bones and brains flying about' (p.22). Though his emotional description of 
the killing of little girls by members of the Einsatzgruppen, according to LaCapra, veers perilously close to 
kitsch (2001), Goldhagen, whose father was a refugee from Europe, was highly resistant to attempts to explore 
the origins of his approach to the Holocaust, and regarded allegations of 'displaced, unacknowledged revenge 
impulse' as intrusive (Rosenbaum, 1998). Yet in trying to avoid objectifying the victims, Goldhagen might be 
said, like Lanzmann, to have over-identified with them. (Shalom Auslander's comic novel, Hope: a Tragedy, 
briliantly satirises through the character of the hero's grandmother this impulse of post-Holocaust generations 
to insert themselves retrospectively into the narrative (Picador, 2012).) In reality the researcher or critic is 
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more, and not less, likely to produce a sentimentalised, sacralised representation of the survivor or victim if 
they fail to be attentive to their own projections. Let me give you a cautionary tale from my own experience. 
In January 1998 The Guardian sent me to interview Binjamin Wilkomirski, author of the already acclaimed 
supposed Holocaust memoir 'Fragments' (1996). I was moved by both book and author, despite two fleeting 
concerns. (It is hard to recover these on exactly the scale that they struck me at the time, so tempting is it to 
place oneself retrospectively in the 'doubters' camp, but I shall try.) Firstly, Wilkomirski told me that he didn't 
know how old he was but that 'my doctors guess that I might have been born at the end of 1938 or the 
beginning of 1939' (Karpf, 1998, pp.2-3).  In the interview, though, he also mentioned that January 22 was his 
birthday. I phoned him later to ask him to clear up the contradiction, and he elaborated that he celebrated 
January 22 as his birthday because this was the date that he emerged from Birkenau. Consequently I started 
my article with the sentence, 'It was only after  I'd left Binjamin Wilkomirski in his hotel room that it occurred 
to me that he was a man without a birthday,' and then went on to talk about the substitute birthday that he'd 
fashioned for himself. In other words I did some of the interpretive work on Wilkomirski's account in order to 
resolve the contradiction: I placed the two comments together in a mutually supportive sequence.  
Secondly, I was struck by how lachrymose Wilkomirski was. I grew up in a community of survivors and hardly 
ever saw one cry: most of them had learnt to armour themselves against tears during the Holocaust and those 
I knew well were at the steely end of the emotional spectrum. Wilkomirski's tears flickered somewhere on my 
gauge of discrepancy but I never pursued this. Moreover, when I recounted the contents of both book and 
interview to my mother, she immediately retorted that there were no child survivors of Majdanek, and 
certainly not one so young. I dismissed her reaction. What is intriguing in hindsight is that I was more able and 
willing to discredit my mother's response than I was able to discount Wilkomirski's. Why did I - admittedly, not 
alone - prove so gullible, especially since Lawrence Langer, among many others, has protested that, from his 
first reading, he 'assumed that Fragments was a fictional narrative'? (2006, p.50) 
One's reading of any text is shaped by many factors: in this case, mine could be said to have been 
overdetermined. The book arrived already lionised as a memoir, which seemed a guarantor of its facticity. Its 
very fragmentariness seemed to mimic the broken nature of memory and in particular a child's memory, 
lending it further authenticity. It was the Holocaust story, perhaps, that was yearned for as the century in 
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which the Holocaust took place was drawing to a close - the story of the child who survived what Anne Frank 
did not, who could take the 'late born' into the next century, and the perfect ‘postmodern ‘ text, fragmentary, 
without strict chronology. But there were also personal reasons that predisposed me to believe Wilkomirski 
and allow my reservations only whispering room. My reactions were shaped primarily, I now think, by my 
relationship with Holocaust testimony, specifically that of my mother, which had occupied a central, 
incontestable place in my life. While I could challenge my mother's reaction to Wilkomirski's book - that, after 
all, was simply her opinion, albeit a highly informed one - I could no sooner dispute his apparent testimony 
than that of my own parents. My own excess became clear in my feelings when his duplicity was unmasked: a 
deep sense of rage at the deception, at his appropriation of a story that was more 'mine' than 'his' (in reality, it 
belonged to neither of us) and at the exploitation of my own readiness to believe that had been forged so 
painfully in my childhood. 
Fractures 
Most survivor families are highly sensitive to the rupture of the family line, and find different ways of trying to 
come to terms with it, but the recognition of and response to the fragmentation of the subject (which 
Wilkomirski so unerringly identified in the title of his work) is a key issue in Holocaust narrative generally. 
While Freud compared the joint work of analyst and patient to an archaeologist's excavation of a destroyed or 
buried building (1958d), Foucault stressed the discontinuities and fractures, thresholds and limits present in 
historical analysis: he argued for the questioning of 'ready-made syntheses', and their replacement by the idea 
of 'dispersed events' (1989, p.24). Nevertheless, Dori Laub claims, the Holocaust researcher can synthesise the 
traumatic testimony of survivors into a unified narrative: 'the historian is now in a position to witness those 
fragments that have come together and to integrate them with facts that she has from other sources (Laub 
and Finchelstein, 2010, p.57). Yet surely the researcher must resist the temptation to reconstitute the shards 
of testimony into something too whole: unbroken is an adjective, describing a pristine state - there is no verb 
to 'unbreak'. (This should not be confused with the argument that the Holocaust is essentially unrepresentable 
and incomprehensible - an argument that Rupnow (2012) expertly dismantles.) Indeed the Scrolls of 
Auschwitz, as described by Chare and Williams, are themselves material metaphors of  Holocaust memory - 
buried, uncovered, recovered, restored but always fragmentary. It seems fitting that they were discovered in 
different decades - the 1940s, 50s, 60s and 80s, like different sedimentary layers of memory and 
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understanding, a palimpsest, a reminder that retrieval of Holocaust evidence can never be complete, and will 
always inevitably be refracted through the time of its finding. Chare, in his understanding of the problematics 
of restoration and the risks of normalising the Scrolls, seems exquisitely able to tolerate their brokenness 
(2011).  
Chare and Williams have also acknowledged what so many researchers have found unbearable: the enforced 
complicity of the Scrolls' authors - members of the Sonderkommando and thus of what Primo Levi called 'the 
Grey Zone' (1989) - in mass murder. As a result, following James Young (1988), they can summon the cool 
historicity to view the Scrolls as literary documents, and are able to wrest deeper, more extraordinary 
meanings from them: that the penmanship of one of the Scrolls' authors, Leyb Langfus, suggests 'that he saw 
himself as a self. This is not the writing towards disintegration' (Chare, 2011, p.85); that even in such close 
proximity to the crematoria, precision of expression was so highly valued. This helps us understand that, in 
such conditions, precision of expression becomes not a creative flourish or literary self-indulgence but an 
existential imperative. 
Chare sets himself against 'a perceived quasi-spiritual revelation of the truth of the object', in favour of a deep 
theoretical engagement with the Scrolls and their materiality, and argues that they demonstrate 'a faith in the 
testimonial capacity of language under the most extreme conditions' (pp.xx-xxi). Yet this is no easy, 
redemptive uplift, of the kind that takes place at the end of 'Schindler's List', where the survival of a handful of 
Jews seems to have begotten an entire nation, seemingly a replacement for those who have died. Or the sort 
of redemption found all too often in writings about Anne Frank, whose ruthlessly decontextualised few lines 
about still believing that people are good at heart that have become so famous (the ones about people’s 
innate “urge to destroy.. to kill.. murder and rage” have curiously never found equal fame) have turned her 
into an emblem of forgiveness, as though she were in some sense anticipating her own death and absurdly 
exonerating those responsible. Even as generally sensitive a critic as Francine Prose colludes with this trope, 
arguing that Anne Frank lives on in the vitality of her writing, just as she always wanted to (2010).
 
But Anne 
Frank isn’t alive: she died a horrible death (Karpf, 2010). Gabriel Josipovici has argued that 'when communal 
memory, dialogic memory, breaks down or disappears, myth rushes in to fill the gap' (Josipovici, 1999, p.323). 
Little exemplifies this more than the mythologising of Anne Frank.  
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So how can the Holocaust researcher steer a path between a positivist refusal to reflect on their own 
implication in what they study, and an over-identification with the victim that produces such intolerable 
anxiety that they must vaporise it with consoling messages or the illusion of having reunited the shards of 
testimony?  Saul Friedländer suggests that 'the voice of the commentator' should be clearly heard, and it 
should 'disrupt the facile linear progression of the narration, introduce alternative questions' (qtd in 
Eaglestone, 2004, p.187) but 'without giving in to the temptation of closure' (1994, p.261). LaCapra calls for 
'empathic unsettlement' (2001, p.41), a receptivity to other people's traumatic experiences without their 
appropriation, and the undergoing by the historian of 'muted trauma' (1998, p.40).  
Both Friedländer and LaCapra's proposed stance are variants of what Freud called 'working through', rather 
than 'acting-out'. In the latter, the patient repeats in the form of an action a trauma that they have repressed - 
repeats instead of remembering. In working through, by contrast, the patient attains a reconciliation with their 
repressed material through the medium of the transference, which allows it to change (Freud, 1958b). 
Similarly while mourning results in the patient's eventual return to vitality, its pathological form, melancholia, 
involves a narcissistic identification with a lost object (Freud, 1958c). Indeed we could see archival fetishism as 
a refusal to mourn the lost object: by choosing instead a melancholic attempt to preserve it, this kind of 
research paradoxically keeps it lost. Working through and mourning are related to what Melanie Klein called 
the 'depressive position', in which the persecutory anxieties to be found in the split paranoid-schizoid 
condition become more muted as the infant learns to tolerate ambivalence, and reaches the stage where the 
internal object can be simultaneously loved and hated Klein, 1986). For Holocaust scholars and commentators, 
the depressive position can serve as a foil to omnipotent phantasies, an encouragement to accept those 
limitations that the 'completism' of archival fetishism denies. Hannah Arendt, though she was famously hostile 
to psychoanalysis, adopted a stance not dissimilar to the depressive position when she maintained that, as 
regards the Holocaust, 'the best that can be achieved is to know precisely what it was, and to endure this 
knowledge, and then to wait and see what comes of this knowing and enduring' (1993, p.20). 
The Hare With Amber Eyes exemplifies the work of mourning and a hard-won attainment of the depressive 
position. The book ends with de Waal's journey with his younger brother, Thomas, to Odessa, the city where 
the Ephrussi family started. They find the family house only to learn that it has just been renovated, its 
remaining original contents despoiled and discarded only a month before. 'I am too late', de Waal laments, his 
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mania for chronicling artefacts finally left unsatisfied. But as he looks out of the window at the vista to the 
Black Sea he realises that traces of his ancestors are still, in some sense, there, in the stories of Isaac Babel and 
in the charitable endowments they left behind. This understanding seems to free him to 'Let it go. Let it lie. 
Stop looking and stop picking things up... Just go home and let these stories be' (2010, p.346). De Waal's 
compulsion to document, though it results in an eloquent book, trapped him in a quest for infinite detail, one 
carrying a powerful emotional charge and libidinal energy. It is only once he works out what has been killed off 
and what remains - an essential task of mourning - that he is able to let go and allow the past to be past. 
On the other hand, we could argue that the task of integrating the Holocaust into Jewish life and history 
without melancholia is too psychically and culturally great to be achieved either individually or - so relatively 
soon after the events themselves - historiographically. Perhaps the depressive position is only occasionally 
attainable. Josipovici counsels that 'We must accept that we cannot respond as we ideally should, and that 
sometimes we cannot respond at all. We should ask ourselves how often our involvement with the details of 
the Holocaust has more to do with our own pathology, with our suppressed guilt and our suppressed 
masochism' (pp.326-7).  
The case of the historian Otto Dov Kulka demonstrates both the limitations of history from which all affect has 
been evicted, and the impossibility of achieving a neat synthesis of documentation and reflexivity. Kulka's 
example is an extreme one, in that he is both a historian and a child survivor. Now based in Jerusalem, he was 
born in 1933 in Czechoslovakia, from where, aged 10, he was deported with his mother first to Theresienstad 
and thence to the 'family camp' in Auschwitz. Kulka had, as a historian, described this camp and its liquidation 
in an article based on documents he had found in German archives, an article in which 'I use the third person, 
as one who is describing a distant historical reality' (Kulka, 2013, p.18). Indeed, he assumes that: 
 readers of my historical publications will have identified me unequivocally with an attitude of strict and 
impersonally remote research, always conducted within well-defined historical categories, as a kind of self-
contained method unto itself. But few are aware of the existence within me of a dimension of silence, of a 
choice I made to sever the biographical from the historical past. (p.xi)  
Eventually, however, this professional exile from his biographical past became unsustainable:  
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That rigorous 'pure scientific' writing is fraught with tremendous 'meta-dimensional' baggage and tensions... 
The fact is that in all my research I never had to deal with the stage, the dimension, of the violent end, the 
murder, the humiliation and the torture of those human beings. I left, or skirted that dimension.(pp.82-3) 
In a slim new volume he faces it directly. Saturated with affect and a recovered subjectivity, alongside dreams 
and speculation, his memoir ends with a near-disintegration of the rational, which is replaced by an almost 
messianic, quasi-religious vision. An appendix reprints his article on the family camp, from which Kulka qua 
inmate is banished. The contrast is astonishing - a colossal psychic split made manifest within the covers of a 
brief book. Kulka, even now, understands only too well the rationale for his former stance: 'had I not found 
that 'safe passage' I could not have borne those tensions and anxieties' (p.93). 
While most contemporary Holocaust researchers and commentators do not have to carry the 'meta-
dimensional' baggage that Kulka does, developing an understanding of the routes that they have taken to 
ensure their own 'safe passage' can only enhance their work.  
  
I am grateful to Dan Stone and Daniel Pick for their invaluable comments on this paper. 
 
                                                          
1
 A term I dislike precisely because it places children of survivors in too close a relationship with their parents' experiences,  
presuming an identification which it should be problematising 
2
 Personal communication, 21.10.11 
3 Rupnow, op cit, p63. Rupnow has challenged the concept of 'memorycide', arguing that, in reality, the Nazi politics of 
memory was much more ambivalent and contradictory, and amounted to an attempt to 'Aryanise' the representation of 
their crimes. 
4
 See also Die Namen der Nummern (berlin: Fischer, 2007), in which Hans-Joachim Lang identifies the 86 victims gassed by 
the Nazis in August 1943 in Natzweiler-Struthof concentration camp. 
5
 This is also the title of a book by Rotzoll and her colleagues (Fuchs et al, 2007) 
6
 Personal communication, 21.10.11 
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